On
In
In 2018, the government moved under § 3730(c)(2)(A) to dismiss the EMTALA claim, arguing that the costs of litigating the matter outweighed the benefits. The district court granted the government's motion absent any oral argument or hearing, leaving only Vanderlan's retaliation claim remaining. After the Polansky decision, however, the district court "invited" Vanderlan to supplement his motion for reconsideration of the court's dismissal order. Also, in light of Polansky, the government intervened in the matter without objection. The district court then severed Vanderlan's retaliation claim into a separate action so that Vanderlan could continue to pursue this claim regardless of the outcome of the court's reconsideration.
After conducting a de novo review of the parties' arguments and the applicable law, the court again granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the government met the minimal burden established in Polansky when it offered a "reasonable argument" for why the costs of proceeding in litigation outweigh the benefits. Once this low burden was met, the government was owed substantial deference under Polansky. Though Vanderlan alleged the EMTALA violations were so exceptional that they exceeded the scope of the government's right to seek dismissal, the court was unconvinced. Further, although Vanderlan argued that a grant of dismissal cannot precede discovery or an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Polansky suggests otherwise. Under Polansky, "[i]f the government offers a reasonable argument for why the burdens of continued litigation outweigh its benefits, the court should grant the motion," and the term "argument" does not suggest a discovery nor an evidentiary hearing requirement. Lastly, the court rejected Vanderlan's claim that a grant of dismissal absent discovery or an evidentiary hearing would violate his Constitutional rights. The court reasoned that it satisfied Vanderlan's right to procedural due process by providing Vanderlan notice and an opportunity to be heard through briefing, oral argument, and proffered exhibits. Vanderlan's right to substantive due process was satisfied by a finding that the government's decision to dismiss was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
Since Polansky, two other district courts have granted motions brought by the government under (c)(2)(A). As previously discussed in this blog, in
Since Polansky, two circuit courts have also affirmed pre-Polansky district court grants of dismissal brought under (c)(2)(A). In
Together, Wolf Creek, Sargent, and, most recently,
- A Low Bar for Dismissal: SCOTUS Gives
Supreme Court's Polansky Decision Presents the Prospect of a Constitutional Defense toQui Tam Cases- Webinar — A Busy Year:
U.S. Supreme Court Decides Two Important False Claims Act Cases in a Single Term - Following Polansky, What Does It Mean To Be "Heard" on a Government Motion To Dismiss?
- Our Predictions for 2024: False Claims Act Constitutionality
DOJ Wants Out: District Court Grants Government'sFirst Post -Polansky (c)(2)(A) Motion to Dismiss Relator's CaseFCA Panel at ABA White Collar Conference Share Views on Schutte, Polansky, andNew DOJ Pilot Program for Whistleblowers DOJ Flexes Its Post -Polansky (c)(2)(A) Muscles and Moves To DismissQui Tam Midway Through DiscoveryDOJ 's 2023 False Claims Act Recoveries and Early Trends in 2024
* Alejandra Uria contributed to this blog. Alejandra is a graduate of
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